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FOREWORD
This report is one of five documents covering the results of the Space
Station Crew Safety Alternatives Study conducted under Contract
NASI-17242. The study documentation is designated as follows:
Vol. I - Final Summary Report (NASA CR-3854)
Vol. II - Threat Development (NASA CR-3855)
Vol. III - Safety Impact of Human Factors (NASA CR-3856)
Vol. IV - Appendices (NASA CR-3857)
Vol. V - Space Station Safety Plan (NASA CR-3858)
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I. INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
TileU.S.mannedspaceprogramhas concerneditselfwith the engineering
technologyrequiredto placea man on the moon,with the medicalrequirements
for survivalbeing an importantalliedpart. However,basicbiological
researchhas playedonly a secondaryroleand the socialscienceshave been
comparativelyignored. By comparison,the U.S.S.R.spaceprogramhas placeda
greatemphasison the biological,psychologicaland sociologicalaspects.
They havedevelopeda trainingprogramthat includeslearningto handlestress
and isolationthroughsurvivalmissions,anechoicchamberisolation,and
parachutejumping. The Sovietsalso utilizea Groupof PsychologicalSupport
thatmonitorsthe cosmonautsduringthe missions;lookingfor signsof stress
and thenprovidingways to reducethis. (173)
The behavioraland psychologicalfactorsof the astronautsinvolvedin
long-durationspacemissionsare extremelyimportantandmust be investigated
in futureflights. Kubisand McLaughlinhaveexpressedthis need: "It is
well knownthatenergiescan be mobilized,stresscan be adaptedto, and
discomfortcan be toleratedfor shortperiodsof time. But underconditions
of contii1uouslongtermmobilizationof effortagainstunrelentingstresses,
theremay well be a degradationof the resistanceand adaptabilityof the
astronautdespiteconditioningwhichtheyhave acquiredin training." (096)
The U.S.traditionalon-orbitworkloadshavebeenheavywithclearlydefined
tasks and goals. Mostcrewmembershavebeenhighlymotivatedtestpilots
accustomedto stressand danger. SpaceStationcrewswillbe comprisedof a
majorityof memberswith lessextensivetrainingthanthe traditional
astronautcorp. However,as crewmixtureschangeand durationof tllemissions
extend,stresswill increasinglyimpactupon safety.
SAFETYIMPACTSOF HUI,IANFACTORSASSESSMENT
To approachthe problemof human factorsand safetyinteraction,several
approacheswere used. The Rockwellapproachidentifieddiscretesubelements
that relateto safetyand placedtheseelementsin a personal/habitability
matrix. Independentlyof this,NASAAmes researchers,Marc M. Cohenand Maria
Jungeapproachedthe identificationof these subelementsthroughthe stressor
route. The HumanStressors,i.e.,noise,confinement,taskassignment,etc.,
were identifiedas partof a HumanFactorsinteractionmodel involvingSpace
Habitationand Working. This interactionmodel is presentedin Section2 of
this volume.
Discretesubelementsidentifiedas stressorsin the NASAinteraction
modeland alsoas the humanfactorssafetyissuesidentifiedin the Rockwell
matrixeswerecomparedfor correlation.The correlationfactorwas high. The
fundingand scheduleconstraintson thisstudylimitedselectionof the
stressorsthatcouldbe assessedfor safetyimpact. Rockwell,togetherwith
NASAAmes, agreed on a listingof stressors to be reviewed. These stressors
are listedbelowand discussedin this volumein the sectionsnoted.
STRESSOR SECTION
Crisis Management 3
Confinement/Isolation 4
Acoustics 5
Territorial Issues 6
Behavorial Protocols 7
Scheduli ng 8
C1eani ng/Di si nfecti ng 9
Hygiene 10
Recreation 11
Violation of Safety 12
Approacll
Each of these stressors were addressed to determine what safety issues
evolved. Once these issues were identified, strategy options for their
control were sought. A summaryof these strategy options follow each
section. These are options not requirements. The purpose is to allow the
Space Station planners flexibility in implementing the Space Station program.
AREASOF FURTHERSTUDY
In somecases, strategy options may indicate selecting a resolution
approach that pushes the state-of-the-art. Oneof the overall objectives of
this study was to identify areas needing further study either with or without
today's technological capability. These areas are summarized at the end of
every secti on.
ANALOGUES(352)
Next to atmospheric conditions, living space and privacy ilave the
greatest influence upon morale, performance and general well being on long
term missions. Excessive demandson man's ability to endure adverse
environmental factors can result in deterioration of his capabilities,
information intergration, problem solving, decision making, etc.
The habitabilty of the crew's living quarters can affect the capability
of the crew to perform missions. Somefactors that are known to cause great
annoyance on long duration activities are: insomnia, lack of exercise, lack
of privacy, crowding, poor food and noise levels.
Psychological problems becomemore imposing with duration of the mission
and deserve increased consideration. Someof these problems are unique with
isolated confined environments such as reaction to prolonged periods of
sensory and social isolation, reaction to unfamiliar environment, etc. These
stresses when combined with others could threaten the successful completion of
any mission.
Space Station Stressors
Investigation of analogues isolated environments included submarines,
Antarctic stations, communication stations, drilling rigs and fixed underwater
habitats. The first two, submarines and Antarctic stations, appeared to
incorporate the significant stressors of the other environments. Figure I-I
summarizesthose stressorsof the submarineand Antarcticenvironmentsthat
couldrelateto the spacestationenvironment.It appearsthatthe noted
stressors,in additionto micro-gravity,beganto describethe environmental
stressorsto be expectedin a longterm spacestationoccupancy.
The environmentsof the threescenariosaboveare noveland uniqueand
involvepotentialdangerfromboth individualaccidentsand the failureof
lifesupportsystems. Onceestablished,the dailyroutine,in eachcase,carl
be monotonous.Due to the natureof theseenvironments,individualsmay be
requiredto suddenlyshiftfroma stateof boredomintotheirhighestlevelof
physicaland mentalactivityand copewithan emergency. A certaintypeof
individualis requiredto successfullymeet theserequirements.The presence
of sociallynonadaptivecre_membersin a closed,isolatedgroupcan
significantlydecreasethe group'sefficiency.
Includedin this sectionare analogueswhich discussthe conditions
presentin the Antarctic,submarineand Skylabscenarios.Parallelstressors
beginto emergefromtilecomparison.
AntarcticResearchStations(352)
Of the severalnationsmaintainingpermanentAntarcticresearch
stations,the U.S.AntarcticResearchProgramis uniquein its organization
and heterogeneityof personnel. The U.S.Navyprovidesthe facilities,
maintenance,and supportpersonnel;the NationalScienceFoundationprovides
the scientificstaff. Thereilasbeena permanentAmericanpresencein
Antarcticasincethe InternationalGeophysicalYear,1957.
Size of Group- The sizeof groupswintering-overat the fourU.S. stations
has rangedbetweeneightand 30 personnelin recentyears. The averagesize
is 16, and the medianis 20. Duringthe foursummermontIls,as many as l,O00
Americansliveand work in Antarctica;duringtileeight-monthwinter,fewer
thanlO0 remainin isolationand confinement.
Compositionof Group- Approximatelyone-halfof thosewinteringover are
civilianscientists(meteorologists,geologists,and biologists)and one-half
are Navypersonnel. The Navy groupis composedof aboutequalnumbersof
Seabees(construction,logistics,andmaintenanceresponsibilities)and
administrative/technicalpositions(coordinationand communication
responsibilities).The educationalbackgroundsrangefromhighschoolto
advanceddegrees. Tilerangeof participants'ages is 18 to 45years;most are
in tI1eir20s or 30s.
Althoughseveralwomenparticipatein summeractivitiesat 14cI4urdo
Station,only a few havewinteredoversincethe firstwomendid so in 1979.
Form of SocialOrganization- Thereis a Navyand a civiliangroupleaderat
each station.
Durationof Tour - A totalof 13 months: one month in transit,fourmonthsof
summer,and the eight-monthwinter-over.
Typesof Tasks - Work activitiesincludehabitatmaintenance(generators,
heatingand ventilation,etc.)scientificlaboratorywork,brieffieldtrips
in wintergear,housekeeping,foodpreparation,and administrativetasks.
SUBMARINE SPACESTATION ANTARCTIC
• CLOSEDCYCLE • • LONGPERIODSOF
ENVIRONMENT t ISOLATION
• • NO COMMUNICATIDi4
• CROWDEDQUARTEP_ *
• •RELIANCE ON MEDICAL
•NO "OUIET"PLACE • CAPABILITY
• oESCAPE NOT POSSIBLE
• CLOSECREW INTERACTION • IMMEDIATELY
REQUIRED
• • HOSTILEENVIRONMENT
CANNOTBE AVOIDED
•OPERATIONS& TRAINING •
PRIMEMISSION
• • SURVIVALDEPENDSON
OUTSIDEFORCES
• • STATIONMAINTENANCE
PRIMEMISSION
NOTE:
MOST SEVEREISSUESFROMEACHENVIRONMENTDIRECTLYAPPLYTO SPACESTATION
Figure I-I Space Station and Analog Stressors
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Preparedness for Mission - Each group usually includes a few menwith polar
experience. Most participants have never experienced anything like an
Antarctic winter. Also, Navy personnel receive sometechnical training, and
scientific staff receive an orientation concerning conditions to be expected.
The Navy is responsible for psychological screening of potential winter-over
personnel.
Personal Motivation - The prospect of scientific discovery is a paramount
motivation for scientific staff. Navy personnel frequently cite the
opportunity to earn and save money as their primary reason for volunteeringfor Antarctic duty.
Hostility of Outside Environment - The average annual temperature at the South
Pole Station is -60_F. Under normal wind conditions at this temperature,
exposed flesh freezes in 30 seconds or less. Temperatures drop to -II2°Fduring the winter.
Perceived Risk - The primary sources of danger are accidents while working
outdoors. Accidental deaths are not uncommonamongthose participating inAntarctic research.
Physical Isolation - During the eight-month winter, Antarctic stations are
totally isolated from outside contact. There are no visitors, no supplies,
and only very infrequent radio contact is possible.
Psychological Isolation - The feeling of psychological isolation is nearly
complete. Sporadic radio contact is established with support base and
occasionally with hamoperators. Newsof tile outside world is a scarce
commodity.
Amount of Free Time - Because little work can be conducted outdoors during the
winter, free time is abundant. It is estimated that 8-10 hours per day are
available for self-maintenance and recreation.
Quality of Life Support Conditions - The temperature within a room frequently
ranges from O_F near the floor to 85°F six feet above the floor. Humidity is
low except in the galley, where meals are taken. There it reaches 80%.
Saunas and hot water showers are provided.
Food is abundant and of excellent quality. Most men spend a
disdroportionate amount of time eating and lingering over their meals; most
also gain several pounds during the winter. Copious quantities of alcoholic
beverages are also consumed: a daily average of approximately 9 ounces of
distilled liquor and 5.4 beers per day amongthe group.
Physical Quality of Habitat - The stations are small and usually crowded. The
current South Pole Station consists of ten buildings, including homemade
versions of a sauna, basketball and racketball courts, and a bar. A geodesic
domecovers the station and protects it from drifting snow.
Privacy and personal space are at a premium; this is especially true for
the Seabees. While the scientific and technical people usually each have a
laboratory or work station they can occupy, membersof the maintenance staff
are limited to their bunks and the commonareas. Much use is madeof the
galley, however, at all hours for snacking, playing cards, and conversing.
Reading is a favorite pastime and all personnel appreciate weekly films and
special theme dinners.
Submarines(352)
The evolutionof submarinetechnologyprovidesa model of the
developmentof complexsystemsinvolvinghumanperformanceunderadverse
conditions.The followingparagraphssummarizethe conditionsaboarda modern
nuclear-poweredballisticmissilesubmarine.Fortunatelyfor submariners,
conditionshaveimproveddramatically.
Sizeof Group - Crewsizeof ballisticmissilesubmarinesrangesbetween133
and 168 personneldependingon vesselclass;140 is most common.
Compositionof Group- Approximately14 officersand 126 enlistedpersonnel
are requlred;no femalecrew. Compositionis mixed in termsof educational
background.
Formof SocialOrganization- Hierarchical,militarycommandstructure.
Durationof Tour - Each submarineis assignedtwo alternatingcrews designated
"Blue"and "Gold." Eachcrewmans the vesselduringa 60-daypatroland
partiallyassistsduringthe intermediate28-dayrefitalongsidea tender.
Type of Tasks - Tasks includeadministration,equipmentmaintenance,
monitoring,standingwatch,radiooperation,housekeepingand foodpreparation
functions.
Preparednessfor Mission- Potentialsubmarinecrewmenmustpass at leastsix
selectionand traininghurdlesbeforetheyare qualifiedfor activeduty.
These includepreselection(eliminatingI0-50%of volunteers),physical
exams/aptitudescreening(I0-20%attrition),escapetraining(I-5%attrition),
basic s/m school(5-20%attrition),advanceds/m school(0-2%attrition),
submarinequalification(5-12%attrition).
Personal14otivation- The reportedreasonsfor volunteeringfor the submarine
serviceare (in decreasingorderof frequencymentionedby a largegroupof
enlistedmen), "pay,goodfood,and opportunitiesto learninteresting
skills." It is also understoodtilatmen volunteerand laterreenlistlargely
becauseof the personalsatisfactionof belongingto a closely-knit,
high-statusgroupand becauseof the privilegeof wearingthe dolphins,the
covetedemblemof the submarineservice.
Hostilityof OutsideEnvironment- Sixtydaysof each tourare spentsubmerged.
PerceivedRisk - Submarineserviceis consideredto be hazardousduty. In
additionto the hostileoutsideenvironment,creware exposedto potential
injuryand deathfromboth humanerrorand equipmentfailure. The presenceof
a nuclearreactorand nuclearmissileson boardis a concernto many crew
personnel.
PhysicalIsolation- During60-daysubmergedcruises,creware isolated
totallyfromthe world.
PsychologicalIsolation- Psychologicalisolationfrom normalsocietyis
equallycomplete. No callsare allowed. Occasionally,periscopeleaveis
scheduled(a peekthroughthe periscopefor crev_ento obtaina glimpseof
topsideactivity,normallywaves).
Amount of Free Time - Approximately three hours are available each day for
self-maintenance and recreation. The Navy provides much to occupy this time:
self-paced educational opportunities, films, arts, crafts, and pIlysical
exercise equipment.
Quality of Life Support Conditions - Air quality aboard modern submarines is
generally good; tobacco smoking is allowed, rendering certain areas unpleasant
to nonsmokers. Toilet facilities are adequate; hot showers are available.
Food is excellent and served at cloth-covered tables in pleasant, paneled
rooms; three seatings are usually required to feed the entire crew. It is an
open mess, and an ice-cream locker, soft drinks, and snacks are available at
all times.
Physical Quality of Habitat - Even though the size of the modern submarine has
increased since World War II, the overall space per man has actually decreased
as a result of increased crew size and the introduction of additional
instrumentation necessary to propel and navigate the vessel and to fire its
weapons. It has been estimated that there are about five cubic yards of space
provided for each crew memberof a nuclear submarine. Each man has a
relatively large berth, equipped with a lamp, draw curtains, and built-in
lockers for personal gear. Although most submariners adapt to the
environment, "confinement" was the most frequently mentioned aspect of
submarine life disliked, while "general living conditions" was the second most
disliked aspect.
Skylab 4 (352) Third MannedMission
Skylab, constructed of surplus hardware from the Apollo program, was
launched on May 14, 1973. In addition to the unmannedlaunch, there were
three mannedmissions conducted between May 1973 and February 1974.
Size of Group - Three-man crew.
Composition of Group - The crew consisted of one Marine Lieutenant Colonel,
one Air Force Lieutenant Colonel (both pilots), and one civilian physicist(Ph.D.).
Form of Social Organization - Skylab ilad a hierarchical organization: mission
commander,pilot, and science pilot. Direction was received from ground
control personnel.
Duration of Tour - The duration of Skylab 4 was 84 days. I_issions 2 and 3
were 28 and 59 days, respectively.
Type of Tasks - Tasks included biomedical experiments, life sciences
experiments, earth resources monitoring, visual inspection, photography,
astronomical observation, communications, maintenance, housekeeping, food
preparation, and administration. Astronauts ventured outside the spacecraft
only during Missions 2 and 3.
Preparedness for Mission - All personnel were professional astronauts. Each
had undergone extensive training and simulation in preparation for the mission.
Personal Motivation - No references to the personal motivations of Skylab
astronauts have been located in the literature. It is assumedthat crew
motivations were other than financial and were probably similar to those of
current astronauts.
Hostility of Outside Environment - The void of space.
Perceived Risk - Exposure to risk was substantial. Although the Apollo
systems had proven reliable, Skylab was a new venture. In addition to the
risks of system failures, crew were exposed to the potential for meteorite
collision, solar flare danger, and critical humanerror.
Physical Isolation - Skylab occupied a low earth orbit, approximately 269
miles above the earth's surface.
Psychological Isolation - The crews of Skylab were in nearly continuous radio
contact with ground control personnel. Also, astronauts frequently used tile B
channel to record their observations, experiences, and interpretations; B
channel recordings were "dumped"at high speed at regular intervals.
Amount of Free Time - The two hours between 8:00 and I0:00 p.m. eacll day _ere
supposed to be the astronauts' own to use as they pleased. In reality,
however, Mission Control typically found someadditional task to occupy some
or all of that time. They probably averaged less than one hour per day offree time.
Quality of Life Support Conditions - The atmospheric pressure aboard Skylab
was about one-third that of earth. At low pressures, sounds do not travel
readily (15 feet for a loud speaking voice); consequently, astronauts were
hoarse most of the time. An oxygen rich mixture was used, witll filters
keeping it fresh to the crew's satisfaction. Food quality and variety were
better than on previous space missions.
Water quality was good, but bubbles in the line, combined with the lower
pressure of Skylab, resulted in severe flatulence. Showers were available
only once each week. Toilet facilities were repeatedly criticized by the
astronauts.
Physical Quality of Habitat - Skylab was an enormous structure. It was
sometimes called "the cluster" or "the can." In fact, it appeared to be a
cluster of cans of varying shapes and sizes. The largest can, the workshop,
was a converted Saturn rocket booster left over from the Apollo program. It
was 48 feet long and 21 feet in diameter. At the forward end was a shorter,
thinner can (about 17 feet longer), at the tip of which the commandand
service modules docked.
Skylab was certainly big enough to qualify as a space station by any
definition; when the command-and-servemodule had docked and becomepart of
the cluster, it had the volume of a three-bedroom house, weighed (had it still
been on earth) almost a hundred tons, and was as tall as a six-story building.
It was the biggest structure any astronaut had ever seen in space.
The three astronauts of the third crew floated head first out of tile
conical command-and-service module; through the docking adapter; through a
hatch into the smaller airlock module; through another hatch into a tunnel
that passed through a ring of gas tanks and other ventilating equipment; and
on into the cavernous workshop, whicll filled what would have been a huge fuel
tank inside the booster. (A smaller tank to the rear \_as used for garbage.)
The workshop tank was divided into an upper and lower deck, tile upper one
being by far the bigger; the lower, which they floated into last of all, was
only a little higher than a man; and it was here, the furthest inside Skylab,
that the astronauts' bedroomsand living quarters were.
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Many itemswere providedto occupytlleastronaut'sleisuretime. These
includedbooks,games,darts,playingcards,and tapedmusic. However,wilat
littleleisuretimetheyiladtheyspenteitherreadingor lookingout the
18-inchdiameterwindowin theirlivingquarters.
Midwaythroughthe 84-daymission,the thirdcrewrefusedto conduct
assignedtasks. This one-day"strike"was imposedto protestthe overloading
of timeby missioncontrollers.The crew spentthe day in individual
pursuits,mostlylookingout the _indow.
See Figurel-l for parallelspacestationand analoguestressorsto draw
correlations.
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2. HUMANFACTORSINTERACTIONMODEL (367)
This section,in its entirety,has beenpreparedby NASAARC co-monitor,
MarcM. Cohenand MariaK. Junge,alsoof NASA-ARC.Thismodelwas presented
at the Proceedingsof the 28tnAnnualMeetingof the HumanFactorsSociety,
October21-26,1984in San Antonio,Texas. This sectionbridgesSpace
Stressorsto discretehumanfactorsissues.
"As NASApreparesplansto developa spacestation,one of the major
HumanFactorsstudytasksis to developan approachto Crew Safety. NASAhas
alwaysbeena paradigmof safetyconsciousnessand recognizesthat safetywill
be a key to reliabilityand humanproductivityon the spacestation.
In evaluatingsafetystrategies,it is also necessaryto recognizeboth
qualitativelyand quantitativelyhow this spacestationwill be differentfrom
all otherspacecraft.Duringthe initialphaseof this study,it was
recognizedthatthe major differencebetweenspacestationand previous
spacecraftis the roleof humanfactorsand extra-vehicularactivity(EVA).
In this project,a model of the varioushumanfactorsissuesand interactions
thatmight affectcrew safetyis developed.
The firststepaddressedsystematicallythe centralquestion: How is
thisspacestationdifferentfromall other spacecraft?A wide rangeof
possibleissueswas identifiedand researched.Fivemajor topicsof human
factorsissuesthatinteractedwithcrew safetyresulted: Protocols,Critical
Habitability,WorkRelatedIssues,CrewIncapacitationand PersonalChoice.
Next,an interactionmodelwas developedthatwould showsomedegreeof
cause and effectbetweenobjectiveenvironmentalor operationalconditionsand
the creationof potentialsafetyhazards. The intermediarystepsbetween
thesetwo extremesof causalitywere the effectson humanperformanceand the
resultsof degradedperformance.The modelcontainsthreemilestones:
stressor,humanperformance(degraded)and safetyhazardthreshold.Between
thesemilestoneare two countermeasureinterventionpoints. The first
opportunityfor interventionis the countermeasureagainststress. If this
countermeasurefails,performancedegrades. The secondopportunityfor
interventionis the countermeasureagainsterror. If this second
countermeasurefails,the thresholdof a potentialsafetyhazardmay be
crossed.
An exampleof how this interactionmodelworkscan be demonstrated.
UnderCriticalHabitability,the primaryenvironmentalstressorsinclude
confinement,isolationand separationfromearth. Thereare two subgroups
withinthe firstcountermeasureagainstthese stressors:socialand
architecturalinterventions.The socialfactorsare communicationwith family
and friends,visitorsto the station,and recreation.The architectural
factorsare design,stationgeometryand "localvertical"reference
orientations,and windows. Whenthesesocialand architecturaldesignlevel
countermeasuresagainststressare not effective,crewperformancemay degrade
in the formof moraledeterioration,impairedjudgementor faulty
perceptions.The secondset of countermeasuresagainsterrorsare
operationalor groupsocialactivitiespluspersonalexistentialactions.
These socialsubsetcountermeasuresincludegroupactivities,hobbiesand time
for personalinterests.The design/physicalcountermeasuresubgroupincludes
colorcodingon interiorfunctions,lightingand video systems. To the extent
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thatthis seconddefenseof countermeasuresis not successful,the threshold
of potentialsafetyhazardsmay be crossed. In this instance,potential
safetyhazardsincludea breakdownin groupprocessand teamwork,and mistakes
occuringin judgement,perceptionor action.
The third step,whichwill requirefurtherresearch,is to applya
systemof weightingto the variousstressorsand countermeasuresin order"to
be ableto evaluatetheirrelativeimportance.Thisweightingwill also
requirean elementof timedurationto identifywhichstressorsor
countermeasuresare relevantat the beginning,middleor end of missions,and
whichare short-livedor chronicin nature."
The followingtable,Table2-I,describesand presentsthis interaction
model.
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TABLE2-1
SPACE STATION CREW SAFETY
HUMAN FACTORS INTERACTION MODEL
GO
MARC M. COHEN
MARIA K. JUNGE
SPACEHUMANS FACTORS OFFICE
LHS: 239-2
NASA-AmesResearchCenter
Moffett Field,CA 94035
TABLE 2-1 (CONT'D)
SPACE STATION CREW SAFETY
HUMAN FACTORS CONCERNS
1. PROTOCOLS
- AUTONOMY FROM GROUND
2. CRITICAL HABITABILITY
3. TASK RELATED ISSUES
._i
._ - TASK ASSIGNMENT
- ROLE DEFINITION
4. CREW INCAPACITATION
5. PERSONAL CHOICE
- INDIVIDUAL SCHEDULE CHANGES
-- OPERATIONAL CHANGES
- WORK PROCEDURE CHANGES
NASA-Ames Research Center
Space Human Factors Office
TABLE2-1 (CONT'D)
SPACESTATION CREW SAFETY
HUMAN FACTORS INTERACTION MODEL
1. PROTOCOLS
L STRESSORS + _ DEGRADED SAFETY
PERFORMANCE _ HAZARD
COUNTER- COUNTER-
MEASURES I MEASURES
AGAINST STRESS I AGAINST ERRORS/
AUTONOMY FROM GROUND
SCHEDULING SCHEDULING SCHEDULING DAILY SCHEDULING LACK OF
OVERLOAD CHANGES CONFLICTS STAFF MEETINGS COORDINATION
CREW ROTATION MISUNDERSTANDING
FAMILY PROBLEMS FAMILY INTER- ABNORMAL DISCIPLINE DELIBERATE
ACTION/SECURE BEHAVIOR COUNSELING CONFLICT
COMMUNICATIONS DEPRESSION INABILITY TO WORK
DISAGREEMENTS AUTONOMY FROM CONFLICTING CHANGES IN VIOLATION OF
WITH GROUND GROUND OBJECTIVES MISSION OBJEC- SAFETY CRITERION
CONTROL TIVES
TERRITORIALITY ACCESS/ TURF CONFLICTS NEGOTIATIONS IMPROPER ENTRY
NON-ACCESS OR INADEQUATE
ACCESS
INCOMPATIBILITIES CREW SELECTION INCOMPATIBILITIES TRAINING LACK OF COOPERA-
CREW TRAINING GROUP PROCESS TION
2. CRITICAL HABITABILITY I
STRESSORS ,_ _ DEGRADED _._ SAFETY ]
PERFORMANCE _ HAZARD
COUNTER- COUNTER-
MEASURES MEASURES
AGAINST STRESS AGAINST ERRORS
VOLUME ARCHITECTURE: FEELINGS OF PRIVACY OR IRRITABILITY
LIMITATIONS DESIGN CLAUSTROPHOBIA EVACUATION PARANOIA
PRIVACY, LACK OF PRIVACY
WINDOWS
SLEEP DISTURB- EARMUFFS. HEAD- FAILURE TO
NOISE VIBRATION, ANCES SETS.DRUGS RESPONDISOLATION AND POOR COMMUNICA- COMMUNICATION FAILURE TOCONTROL
TION DEVICES COMMUNICATE OR
COORDINATE
HOUSEKEEPING ROUTINES AND ENVIRONMENT ASSIGNMENT OF BREAKDOWN IN LIFE
(OR LACK OF) TRAINING QUALITY RESPONSIBILITIES SUPPORT
DETERIORATION TEAMWORK
HYGIENE PERSONAL DISCOMFORT TO GROUP STANDARDS PERSONAL ILLNESS
CLEANLINESS PRACTICES OTHERS INABILITY TO
TRAINING ILLNESS PERFORM TASKS
DISEASE
NASA--Ames Research Center
Stoace Human Factors Office
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TABLE 2-1 (CONT'D)
CRITICAL HABITABILITY II
1STRESSDRS _ DEGRADED = SAFE". PERFORMANCE_ HAZARDCOUNTER- COUNTER-
MEASURES MEASURES
AGAINST STRESS AGAINST ERRORS
THERMAL/HUMIDITY ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOMFORT AIR MOVEMENT INCREASED
CLOSED CONTROLS IRRITABILITY GAS COMPOSITION ANXIETY
ATMOSPHERE CONTROL
TEMPERATURE AND IMPAIRED
HUMIDITY RESPONSE
CONTROL
CONFINEMENT COMMUNICATION LONELINESS GROUP ACTIVITIES BREAKDOWN IN
ISOLATION WITH FAMILY AND MORALE HOBBIES GROUP PROCESS,
SEPARATION FRIENDS DETERIORATION PERSONAL TEAMWORK
VISITORS IMPAIRED INTERESTS MISTAKES IN
SOCIAL EVENTS JUDGMENT JUDGMENT CHECKS JUDGMENT,
RECREATION PERCEPTION UNDER COLOR CODING PERCEPTION OR
COUNSELING STRESS LIGHTING ACTION
CLAUSTROPHOBIA MULTIPLE ACCESS PARANOIA
ARCHITECTURE MOBILITY AIDSGEOMETRY
STOWAGE
ARTIFICIAL LIGHTING DESIGN. FATIGUE SPECIAL TASK MISTAKEN
LIGHTING "NATURAL LIGHT" IRRITABILITY LIGHTING PERCEPTION
BLURRED VISION
3. TASK RELATED ISSUES
PERFORMANCE HAZARD
COUNTER- COUNTER-
MEASURES MEASURES
AGAINST STRESS AGAINST ERRORS
TASK ASSIGNMENT/ROLE DEFINITION
WORK ENVIRON- STATION FATIGUE FACTORS WORK STATION MISTAKE/
MENT PROBLEMS ORGANIZATION/ DESIGN INADVERTENT
DESIGN ACTION
WORK LEADERSHIP CONFLICTSWITH CRISIS RESOLUTION/ CONFLICTING
ORGANIZATION/ TRAINING LEADERSHIP CHAIN OF ACTIONS
LEADERSHIP CONSENSUS COMMAND
TASK ASSIGNMENT TASK SELECTION MONOTONY TASK ROTATION "FAMILIARITY
BOREDOM BREEDS'"
CONTEMPT
LACK OF CAUTION
PHYSICAL CREWSELECTION STRAIN ON MANDATORY "CUTTING
LIMITATIONS PHYSICAL ENDURANCE PHYSICAL EXER- CORNERS'"
ENDURANCE CISE REGIMEN PHYSICAL INABILITY
TO PERFORM TASKS
SCHEDULING AND GROUP ACTIVITIES LOW MORALE CREW/BUDDY LACK OF EFFECTIVE
COORDINATION AND MEETING AND MOTIVATION CHECKSAND CREW INTER-
CONFLICTS DRILLS ACTION
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TABLE2-1 (CONT'D)
4. CREW INCAPACITATION
I DEGRADED SAFETY J
STRESSORS 1
t PERFORMANCE HAZARD
COUNTER- COUNTER-
MEASURES MEASURES
AGAINST STRESS AGAINST ERRORS
SPACESICKNESS SELECTION/ POOR TASK TREATMENT CREW FAILURE TO
GAS BUBBLESIN ADJUSTMENT PERFORMANCE IMPROVE WATER RESPOND
WATER MAINTAIN/CHECK GAS PAINS SYSTEM
WATER SYSTEM
ILLNESS EXAMINATIONS SHORT TERM TREATMENT CONTAGION?
AND HEALTH INCAPACITATION
MAINTENANCE
PROGRAM
INJURY SPACEINDUSTRIAL LONG TERM RETURN TO EARTH? DISTRACTION OF
SAFETY INCAPACITATION STABILIZE ON OTHER CREW
ORBIT? MEMBERS
EMOTIONAL/ CREW SELECTION LACK OF TRUST RELIEF FROM DUTY ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR
MENTAL PROBLEM AND TRAINING AND COOPERATION DETRIMENTAL ACTIONS
FAILURE IN LIFE ABANDON, CONFINEMENT, REPAIRS, REPLACE- LOSS OF ACCESS
SUPPORT SYSTEM EVACUATE ONE TRAUMA MENT TO CRITICAL
MODULE FUNCTIONS
DEATH OF CREW, COUNSELING TRAUMA TO CREW COUNSELING PRESERVATION OR
FAMILY OR FRIENE DISRUPTION OF DISPOSAL OF BODY
TEAMWORK INABILITY TO WORK
5. PERSONAL CHOICE
1 , lSTRESSORS A ___ DEGRADED SAFETYPERFORMANCE HAZARDCOUNTER- COUNTER°
MEASURES MEASURES
AGAINST STRESS AGAINST ERRORS
COOKING/EATING SHARED MEALS IRRITATION ADEQUATE FIRE
HABITS ACCOMMODATION DEPRESSION TRAINING ODORS
(RESTRICTIONS) FOR INDIVIDUAL OUTGASSING
CREW PREFERENCE
INDIVIDUAL EDUCATION PERSONAL AUTON- MONITORING OUTGASSING
PROPERTY MONITORING AND OMY DIMINISHED AND CONTROL CONTAMINATION
(RESTRICTIONS) CONTROL LOWMORALE FLAMMABILITY
CREW TRAINING
BOREDOM, ENTERTAINMENT LACK OF VIGILANCE ADEQUATE CREW PRACTICAL JOKES
MONOTONY CREW SELECTED ACTIVITIES DISTRACTION
ACTIVITIES PLANNING AND ACCIDENTS
SCHEDULING
CLOTHING VARIETY, LAUNDRY IRRITATION, CLEAN FILTERS LINT PROBLEM
CREW PREFERENCE DISCOMFORT CONTAMINATION
LESSPERSONAL FIRE
FREEDOM
PERSONAL HABITS: CREWSELECTION EFFECTS OF OVERUSE COUNSELING FIRE
ALCOHOL CREWTRAINING WITHDRAWAL EVACUATION IMPAIRED
DRUGS SYMPTOMS JUDGMENT
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3. CRISIS rCANAGEMENT
BACKGROUND
The application of work station design employing state-of-the-art
display and control technology will improve tile performance of man in space.
Advanced technology has been developed for input and display of information at
crew stations in aircraft, ships, power generating control rooms, and other
applications which could be used in Space Station.
The current Orbiter cockpit contains approximately 1,500 switching
devices, 3000 communicators, and 40 meters and other electomechanical
displays, maJ_ of which are used only during very short periods of the
mission. Multipurpose displays and controls will enable more efficient
crew/vehicle interaction. Table 3-I implies a possible problem when
considering the number of controls/displays for Space Station.
It is widely recognized that humanoperators do not passively respond to
increased levels of mental workload or stress. Instead, considerable evidence
suggests that they tend to adjust the strategies of information processing
that they employ in an effort to minimize or optimize psychological cost.
Such strategic variation could present problems where high workload, fatigue
and boredom are likely to confront crewmembers. Strategies that may be
adopted by tile stressed operator can be maladaptive with respect to system
goals. For example, a contributing factor in the Three-Mile Island accident
was that the station engineer, at one time, had over one-hundred annunciations(lights, bells, alarms, etc.) actuated.
Coupled with all the other factors that can contribute to the lack of
effective crew coordination in emergency situations is that group members
generally tend to be more dependent on leaders under stressful circumstances.
As a result, the captain is likely to bear even more responsibility for
monitoring and orchestrating the actions of the crew. Hence, the selection of
a commander's leadership style or charateristics is particularly important.
Table 3-I indicated the trend of increase in numbers of controls and
displays expeted in the normal evolution of man's short-to-long term stays in
space. The crisis managementimpact is based on how many of the projected
space station controls and displays relate to emergencies.
More sophisticated annunciator systems are a direct outgrowth of
computer and cathode ray tube (CRT) technology capabilities. The overall data
managementarchitecture approach selected for the space station data
processing will define the ability of cre_anento effetively managecrisis.
Incorporating inherent data edit functions, multi-color displays, split-screen
capability and interactive annunciate/activate scenarios within the space
station data system would be a step in the right direction. In programming
data managementsystems for dynamic functions, the specifier of function tends
to requie annunciation of too much data per element. This, when added to the
annunciation requirements of other elements in a multi-element system,
inundates the crew with information. Trends to assimilate and edit data in
the Maintenance and Data Recorder (MADAR)systems, used on Air Force cargo
aircraft, and the Central Integrated Testing Subsystem (CITS), used on the B-I
aircraft, are an approach to alleviating the tasks of tile crisis manager.
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TABLE 3-I PROLIFERATIONOF CONTROLSANDDISPLAYS
SYSTEM DURATION CONTROLS&
DISPLAYS
APOLLO 14 DAYS 1,300
(NOMINAL)
SKYLAB 84 DAYS 3,000
(EXCEPTIONAL)
SHUTTLE 7-8 DAYS 4,540
SPACESTATION 90 DAY ?
(PROJECTED)
2O
ISSUES
Anthropometrics
It is essentialto notethatthe physicalman-machineinterfaceis
substantiallydifferentunderzero-gconditions.In orderto optimizecrew
stationdesignand operationsplanning,modelsof humanmovementand "neutral
body posture"are needed. The neutralbodypositionof a cre\_emberin micro-
gravityrelatesneitherto the one-gravitysittingor standingposition.
Rather,the neutralbody positionis a semi-crouching/semi-fetalposition.
Neutralbodypositionanthropometricstandardsneedfurtherdevelopment,
definitionand disseminationfor the spacestationdesigncommunity. Once
this anthropometric information is available, placement of critical controls
and displays in the crew "ease see/ease reach" sector can improve crisis
managementcapability.
Inability to Communicate
In zero gravity tne face beomespuffy from the collection of blood in
tile upper body area causing alterations in the features of the face. Witll
this facial distortion, the Russians have reported that the discontinuity
between the verbal messageand the facial messagecaused confusion about the
real intent of the message. (155) A series of commonlyunderstood phrases
and hand signals will have to be devised to address emergency situations.
Drills, though a nuisance, imprint the action/message so that response is
automatic.
Automation
Automation offers benefits of increased productivity, safety, and
control of large complex, interrelated systems. However, while automation can
perform sometasks more precisely than humans, there are drawbacks. Many
questions must be asked prior to making decisions on automation, such as:
o What is the function under consideration?
o What are the tasks involved in this function?
o What is the total hypothesized humanoperation participationfor the function?
o What is the total hypothesized equipment participation for the
function? (373)
In NASA-MSFCTM-82510, Tiesenhausen further identifies seven core
performance areas: I) Monitoring, 2) Sensing, 3) Information Processing,
4) Interpreting, 5) Decision Making, 6) Information Storage, and 7)
Controlling. (373) These core performance areas are basic to any function or
activity. To be noted is that all but number 6 above are key to crisis
managementunder high stress, fast reaction conditions. Crisis management
activities, as with critical functions in the space station, should be a
candidate for automation trade studies. Basic to these studies is the need to
postulate as manycontingency scenarios that could realistically occur.
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Recognizingtilatman's proceduralinclusioncannotbe reducedto preset
procedures,identifyingcontingencyoperationsallowsthe totalmanual
interfaceto be reducedif the relatedcrisismanagementfunctionscan be
automated.The tradestudyshouldincludereasonablenessof tilestated
contingency,costs to automateas opposedto riskof manualoperations,costs
to maintainand checkoutautomatedsystemelementvs. the manualelement,and
costs to change procedures witilin the system.
Training
Humanperformance is another factor to be considered in achieving
efficient use of humanswith automated systems. Proper crew training is
essential. Particularly as noted under communications, emergency procedure
training must be stressed.
All major automation functions are subject to the critical question, "Is
this function best assigned to tile lluman operator to the equipment"? These
key functions include sensing, interpreting, information processing, decision-
making, controlling, monitoring and information storage.
STRATEGIES
I. Ensure that critical and emergency controls and displays are in
core reach and sight volume
2. Screen crew for abilities to handle sensory overload
3. Train crew to handle crisis. Develop and implement emergency
procedure scenarios.
4. Identify contingency operations to support emergency procedure
development
5. Identify who is in charge
AREASFORFURTHERSTUDY
The following listing extracts areas identified in the initial study
that should be given more attention. Someof these items may be underway or
have been completed. These items, in no way, commenton completeness or
status of the related items. Rather, the list indicates that within the data
reviewed there seemedto be areas of data deficiency.
I. Determine degree of automation needed and/or desired for
interactive crisis management
2. Expand and disseminate anthropometric data on the micro-gravity
"neutral body" position
3. Further develop the software architecture and approaches to allow
editing, recombination and understandable annunciation of many data
elements to support real time decision making under conditions of
stress
4. Develop testing/screening techniques that can identify or relate
subject's ability to function under high stress conditions
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5. As a partof spacestationsystemsengineeringand integration,
developa "crisismanagement"overlayof all spacestationsignals
and datainterchangenetworksto helpcoordinateaggregationof
annuniations/controllingsignalsnecessaryfor crisismanagement
(emergencyor contingencyoperations)
23
24
4. CONFINEMENT/ISOLATION
BACKGROUND
The humanfactor in isolated realms such as long-duration spaceflight,
Antarctic service and submarine duty has received steadily increasing
attention as more men and womenventure into these new areas. But problems
remain. The usual candidate who enlists for this kind of mission knows very
little in advance about what is likely to be experienced psychologically
during the long period of isolation. The samecan apply when returning home
to a world that has grown and changed.
The word isolation has meanings as varied as its effects. One common
denominator stands out: Isolation separates the individual or group from
important parts of the normal environment. This separation must be accounted
for when planning or anticipating extended ventures into space.
The four main components of isolation are:
I) Confinement, usually protected from a threat, by physical enclosure
or encapsulation.
2) Aloneness or separation from familiar surroundings, with feelings
that one is miles from nowhere in a vast expanse, often accompanied
by feelings of relief and exhilaration in some, but fear and
depression in others.
3) Sensory deprivation, whicll occurs during an absence of sensory
impressions or lack of variety.
4) Stress, encompassing the overall effects of time, pain, danger and
annoyance, perceived both personally and professionally, either
imagined or real.
To date, only a handful of scientists have drawn comparisons between the
psychological effects of life in Antarctica and long duration spaceflight.
Kirmach Maturi elaborates on someof the similarities:
Both environments are novel and unique, and involve potential
danger from both individual accidents and the failure of life support
systems. Once established, the daily routine in both may become
monotonous. However, due to the nature of these environments
individuals may be required to suddenly shift from a state of boredom
into their highest level of physical and mental activity to cope with an
emergency. A certain type of individual is required to successfully
meet these requirements to remain alert to potential hazards over an
extended period of time and to maintain psychological adaptability under
the influence of environmental stresses. (086)
Studies conducted in an isolated and confined environment have identi-
fied a memberof physical and psychological effects as well as individual and
group behavior changes (176). Elements include (177):
25
o Boredom
o Irritability
o Depression
o Anxiety
o FloodFluctuation
o Fatigue
o Hostility
o SocialWithdrawal
o VacillatingF1otivation
o Tension
o SleepDisorders
o SensoryDeprivation
ISSUES
Bordeom
Some tasksdo not requirea greatattentionspan nor do they requireany
degreeof concentrationbut must be carriedout with consistencyand accuracy
over a prolongedperiodof time. Tasksof thisnaturemay be hazard
generators.The premiumof automatedversusthe costsof eachman-hourin
spacemay be a gaugeto judgewhichtaskshouldbe candidatesfor automation.
Anotherfacetof this issueis the make-upof the individual.To some,
boredomsetsin whenexternalstimulicease. Considerationin psychological
screeningshouldbe givento selectinga spacestationcrewwith peoplewhose
livesdo not requiremuch externalstimulibut who can providetheirown
mentaland recreationalstimulatio.
Irritability
Causesof irritabilityare foundin stressorsthatconstrainthe
individual,eitherrealor habitual. Thesecan include:
UnwantedDirection
Inabilityto PerceiveExtendedSpace
LimitedPersonalInterfaces
OverFamiliarityFromCo-Workers
AbrasiveHabitsof Others
Inabilityto Get Along
Unlikeboredom,irritabilityis engenderedby an excessof specific
externalstimuli. Althoughthe tendencytowardirritabilityexiststo varying
degreesthe prime stressorsshouldbe controlledso thata spacestation
cre_nanshouldbe able to removehimselffromthe stressingenvironments.The
safetyissueis that irritabilityengendersaberrantactionsthatcould
precipitatea hazardoussituation.
Depression
Psychologistshave describedthe difficultyof the Antarcticwinteras
"theabsenceof customarysourcesof gratification".(258) In otherwords,
being stuckwithoutmuchto do. The obviousstressesare parallelwitilthose
of space: no grass,no trees,no livingthings,but thereare tileunseen
stressesthatlend to the problemsassociatedwith depression.The apparent
stressesthatbeginthe depressionare the socialisolationand the on-going
monotomy. "You'veheardeverybody'sfavoritestory,you knowtheirgood
habitsand bad habits"(258) But the normalway of dealingwith thingswhen
one is fed up are not available;for example: goingoutsidefor a walk or
seekingotherpeople.
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The way that people eventually respond is called "depressed affect" a
sort of mental shifting into neutral. This affect also takes place in
submarine crews and other people in confined situations with little stimulus.
A person who "turns himself off" can be liability within tile station, unable
to accept, give or execute orders.
Anxiety
Confinement/Isolation is a major stressor to people with claustrophobia.
This is a discernible trait. Aside from fear of enclosed spaces as an anxiety
generator, the crewman's anxiety may be founded in concern for personal safety
and survival in a hostile environment. Antarctic area anxieties were
sometimes traceable to the fact that the available medical facilities did not
alleviate a person's fear of untreatable illness or injury. This subject is
treated separately in Section 4 of Volume II. In confined areas, anxieties
appear to be directed toward ability to survive and capability to perform
under conditions of stress. The former may be addressed by providing a
comprehensive orientation of the space station and the system provided to
counter threats. The latter, performance under stress indicates a need for
more comprehensive training and cross-training in primary and peripheral
skills.
The other anxiety issue is actual and perceived volume. Physical
factors may determine module size initially. Within these constraints the
judicious use of interior design (color, light, spacial arrangement) may give
the space crewmembera feeling of greater openness than exists. Tile growth
station may consider inflatables or fabricated spheres to realize a larger
single volume for a crew wardroom.
The safety issue is possible physical/psychological illness driven by
anxiety.
MoodFluctuations
Socially non-adaptive individuals may be particularly disruptive to the
efficiency of a group working in an isolated condition. The socially
competent individual adjusts his or her behavior to be consistent and
compatible with the microculture of the group. Open expression of personal
values or aesthetic tastes may generate conflict within the group.
Non-adaptive individuals presenting a dissenting value system may have an
especially difficult time in maintaining their self-esteem under the continual
pressure to conform to the standard group. Individuals may then respond with
mood fluctuations which can lead to ineffective job performance. Such
fluctuations noted in Antarctic situations include: sulking, temper tantrums,
behavior abuses, chronic complaints and series of ups and downs that parallel
with visitors during the summermonths.
The Russians have a mannedcapsule that visits every other month.
Frequently, videotapes of the cosmonaut's families, friends, and co-workers
are sent up to them. They have reported that communication with their
families served as the source of "a most powerful emotional charge". (160)
Issues of screening communication between the family and crew need to be
addressed. Should ground control have any say about what a family membersays
to a crew member? Howoften should they be allowed to communicate? This
issue could be a key factor contributing to mood fluctuations.
The Russians have utilized several methods to stabilize their cosmonaut
crews and carry them over the long periods of isolation. Tile following are
examples of how the Russians have accomplished this.
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TypicalRussianCosmonaut"Up's"
o Visitsof othercosmonautseveryothermonthhelpedease the
psychologicalstressof tilelong flight
o Allowedsomevodka
o In the sixtllweek of the flight,cosmonautstalkedwith movie stars,
musicians,poetsand artiststo keeptheirspiritsup duringtilelong
stay
o The programof talkswithcelebritieswas arrangedby a
psychologicalsupportgroupthatcompleteda studyon the
preferencesand moods of the cosmonauts
o Towardthe end of the 211-dayspacemission,the crewcomplainedof
irritabilitytowardeachotherand requestedand receivedpermissionto
extendtheir sleepperiodsfrom8 to 12 hours
o About a weekbeforereturnto earth,Sovietmedicalpersonnelstated
thattheywere payingincreasedattentionto the physiologicalcondition
of the crew - _latchingthe crew'severymove
o Send up suprisepackagesin the resupplymoduleeveryothermonth
o Tulips(smellof earth)
o Lettersfromfriends,family
o Presents
o Russiansuse as preventivemeasures:
o Tapeand videotaperecorders
o Assembledin accordancewiththe preferencesand tastesof the
uniquecrew
o Foreignmovies,stageproductions
o Videolibrarysupplementedwith new materalby the visitingmission
crewsand progresscargocraft
o Includestapesof families,co-workers,friends
o Crewsreceivediversifiedinfon,lation
o News
o Science/Technology
o Culturalevents
o Sports
o Functionalmusic (reproductionsof the soundsand noisesof
earth)
o Russianscenarionow allowsSaturdayand Sundayoff
o This allowsthemmore timefor theirpersonnalneeds
o Allotstime to catch up on the paperv_ork
o Work on a 9-to-5basis
o On Saturday/Sundayallowedan extrailourof sleep
o Foundthattasty/favoritefoodseasethe tensionof the cosmonaut'swork
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o It was observed that the cosmonauts mademore frequent requests for
transmission of rhythmic music starting with the second month of the
mission
o Shortage of social contacts compensated by organizing communication
sessions with the participation of representatives in different
areas of public life (political, sports, artists)
o A total of 118 such communication sessions involving about I00 people
was organized during the four long missions abord the Salyut-C orbital
station
o Independent importance
o Use of results of the cosmonaut's work
o Use of crew's recommendations
Mood fluctuation is similar to irritability in that it may be the
precursor for aberrant actions or critical tasks.
Fatigue
Factors affecting fatigue are physical as well as psychosomatic. Tile
counter measures are identifiable as ability to work (proper rest and
nutrition), knowledge of job (proper education and training) and reasonable
scheduling demands. The non-physical issues are more subtle. As in the
Antarctic, fatigue following mood swings may be tour of duty related.
Initially, the challenges of a new environment and newjob fends off fatigue.
Once routine sets in, however, signs of fatigue may show. Boredommay be a
precursor to fatigue. Toward the end of a tour, fatigue would tend to be put
aside by planning for post flight activities.
Additional fatigue issues are discussed in Section 6 of this volume.
Hostility
Clash of incompatible personalities can generate hostility - either
suppressed or patent. Irritabilty usually is a precursor to open hostility.
The direct safety issue with hostility is the possiblility that a critical
task may not be done to support a timely requirement. It is not beyond
comprehension that open hostility may require active control measures. One
issueis - "Who'sin charge?" Anotherissueis - "Wilatis he goingto do
about it?" The Polarissubmarinescarrywholebody restraintsuitscalled
"PolarisPajamas". The difficultyin dealingwith hostilityin a closed
environmentis thatone can't go out for a walk/runto blowoff steam. Crews
may needto be taughtgroupprocessskillsto resolveconflicts.
The safetyissuehere is physicalviolence,followedby injuryor damage
to equipment/crew.This safetyhazardcan be manifestedalso in subtleways
thatmay be hardto identifybefore,duringor afterthe creationof a safety
hazard_
SocialWithdrawal
The typeof individualchosenfor isolateddutyis importantin termsof
personalhealthand well-being,individualjob performanceand over-allgroup
effectiveness.Individualswho tendto withdrawintotheirown world are
likelyto becomenon-productive.
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In a studyconductedby the U.S.Army ResearchInstitutefor the
Behavorialand SocialSciences(249)it was foundthata declinein problem
solvingskillswere relatedto environmentalinvariation.Lackof opportunity
to "getout"of tilebarracks,alongwith lessthanchallengingjob
requirementsinteractedto producea declinein the thinkingprocess,which
leadto socialwithdrawal.
Certainindividualsmay be lesssusceptibleto the tendencyof social
withdrawalthanothers. For spacestationlong-duration,a programmust be
maintainedto keep individualsin a stateof readinessand to preventthis
socialwithdrawlsdyndome.Witllthisin mind, additionalburdensmay occurin
a caseof an emergencysituation.
VacillatingMotivation
This issue,togetherwith boredomand fatigue,are probablytied to the
tourof dutyin space. Task schedulingdiversitymay be worth investigating
to addressthis issue. Universalin-taskassignmentmay help to keepthe job
interestquotienthigh. A degreeof routinetasksmay helpto stabilizea
cre_nemberin any diurnalperiod. The safetyissuehereis in attentionto
duty or relatedcriticaltasksand the ensuingconsequencs.
Tension
All the stressorsof confinementand isolationtendto buildtensionin
the personif relievingde-stressorsare not available.Adaptabilitywithina
normalwork environmentusuallytranscendsthe tensionbuilders.
Concentrationon providinga compatiblecrew and a reasonabletaskand living
environmentwouldtend to forestallprecipitatingtensiongeneratingissues.
The safetyissueis the physiologicaltendencyof a persontoward
symptomscausedby tension(headache,gastro-intestinaldisturbances,etc.),
or relatedillness.
SleepDisorders
Confinementsometimesadverselyaffectsthe abilityto sleepsoundly.
Sleep disordersmay providea basisfor irritability,depression,anxiety,
fatigue,hostility,etc. Essentially,withoutreasonablerest,nutritionand
exercise,the humanpersondeteriorates.Bothvisualand auralmaskingto
inducesleep,may be an approachto alleviatethe anxietycausedby
confinementthatwould preyon the individualto preventsleep. Interviews
witllthe presentastronautcorecould shedlighton somesimpleapproachesto
avoidingthis issue. Lackof sleepmay impairthe abilityto perform.
Disorientation
In habitatswhere normalsensoryfeedbackis not possible,the body
systemsdo not work togetherproperly. Vertigo,a motiondynamicsissue,
relatesto coordinatingdiversevisual-cochlealstresses.It is speculated
that visual-motiondiscontinuitiesmay contributeto the highincidenceof
motionsicknessin space. Controlledvisualcueingmay help alleviatethe
problem;for instance,providinga privatetelevisionmonitorthat always,or
on call,presentsa picturethat is 'up"or "inthe directionof flight".
Tactileissuesand dealingwith restraintsmay providean artificial
simulationof g-forcesto shaveoff this issue.
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SovietExperience
Followingthe 14O day Salyut-6flightof 1978,the spaceflightdirector
reportedthat the onlybarrierto longspaceflightsseemedto be
psycllologicalconditions;"manfindshimselfin a smallcollective,extremely
far away fromilome,relativesand friends. It ismore difficultto solve
psychologicaloads".(174) The lackof stimuli,restrictionof livingspace
and monotonyremainsareasof concernto the Soviets.
The safetyissueinvolvesthe inabilityof the sensorydeprivedperson
to respondto a timesensitiveemergencysituation.
STRATEGIES
I. Developplanfor varietybenefitingfromSovietapproach.
a. Set up of privatevideo-communicationfor astronautswould tendto
foretelI boredom.
b. Providelibraryof videotapesto span interestof crew.
c. Providepersonalmotivation/growthcourses/lectures.
d. Includeprovisionsto link-up(taperecord)on demandfor videos
thatwould supportthe crew.
2. Providea "quietplace"for each astronautthatcan includethe personal
itemsof decorphotos,cartoons,books,etc.
3. Providea spacestationvitalstatistics- MET (MissionElapsedTime)
clock,altitude,cabinpressure,etc. - readoutpanelin astronaut
habitabilityarea and/orstateroom.
4. Ensuremedicalcapabilityconsistentwith expectedthreat. See Volume
II,Section4.
5. Considerincludingan architectand interiordesignerin developing
habitabilitydesignsolutions.
6. EstablishUP/DOWNspacestationorientationconsistentwith freeform/
fetalbodypositionin orbit.
7. Entertainthe optionof a single,largevolumemodule (possiblyan
inflatable,or an erectablesphere)for a commonroomto providean open
environment.
8. Investigatepossiblityof includingtransparencies(replaceablewithout
depressurizingmodule)for commonand privateviewingincludingvariable
polarizingor opaqueshades.
9. Providea chemicalor physicalastronautrestraintsystemsimilarto the
"Polaris Pajamas".
lO. Begincrew trainingon the grounda considerablelengthof timebefore
mission.
II. Developa screening/behaviormodificationprogramderivedfrom submarine
and Antarcticdevelopedparametersto ensurecrewcompatibility.
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AREASFORFURTHERSTUDY
The following listing extracts areas identified in the initial study
that should be given more attention. Someof these items may be undem_ayor
have been completed. These items in no way commenton completeness or status
of the related items. Rather, the list indicates that within the data
reviewed there seemedto be areas of data deficiency.
I. Polarized shades vs. opaque shades
2. Allow personalization of cabins or work areas (photos, cartoons,
books, etc.) including decor options
3. Define cre_ember psychological and physiological screening
elements to support functioning in a long term confined/isolated
enviroment
4. Include architectural/interior design consultation in llabitable
module design
5. Consider possibility of single, large-volume space (inflatable or
structurally built-up to provide "open" environment for crew on
growth station
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5. ACOUSTICS
BACKGROUND
Past mannedspace flight programs have dealt loosely with acoustical
requirements within vehicle cabin enclosures. Part of this happened for
reasons of economyand part because the acoustical requirements may have had
nochampion in the procurement agency. Figures 5-I and 5-2 summarize the
"before" and "after" situation of the planned and actual acoustical profiles
for the Apollo and Shuttle programs. These data concern perceived sound in
the crew compartments. The curves show tile NC-50and NC-40 curves that were
targets for programs at their inception. The actuals are indicated. It
appears that when the design objectives were not achieved, the specification
values becamethe actual achieved. Table 5-I relates the NC50number to
typical noise environments. For the most part, noise control of assembled
sub-systems is usually addressed after the fact, and inter-element synergies
are not considered. Space station apportionment of allowable noise to
subsystems should be mandatory so that component suppliers knowwhat their
individual noise design allowables are. Then the integrator can apply
isolation/insulation techniques to augment those actually taken by the
suppliers to control noise.
On STS-3 there was a crew module noise anomaly. The measured value at
the frequency noted peaked between STS-2 and STS-3. An actual noise
measurement isolated the source to a noisy fan motor bearing, which when
replaced eliminated the noise peak. See Figure 5-3.
Sleep on Apollo 13 was affected by the cold, coolant pumpnoise from the
lunar module, and frequent communications with ground control. Psychological
stresses were commonlycauses of sleeplessness. Results of the Skylab program
have indicated that previous loss of sleep was caused by the restricted
conditions rather than any physiological effect of weightlessness.
ISSUES
Figure 5-4 summarizes the acoustical impacts and the stressors affected.
Noise consistantly affects astronauts physically, psychologically and
functionally, and comes high on the list of irritating environmental
pollutants on spacecraft. The irritant effects of noise are well documented.
It can cause stress and pain, disorientation, vertigo, nausea, fatigue, loss
of appetite and interfere with sleep and normal speech communication. (174)
The efficiency and well-being of the crew are affected adversely if the
crewmembers' sleep patterns are constantly disturbed by the environment within
the spacecraft. Spaceflight experience to date has indicated that many crew
membersexperience difficulties in falling asleep, and have needed to take
medication. No clear evidence exists that all astronauts are affected or that
crew memberswho are affected suffer the samedisturbances. Somecomplain
that sleep was inadequate or tilat there was a considerable shift in sleep
periods from expected homesleeptime.
Manyfactors have been postulated to cause sleep disturbances and it is
difficult to show conclusively, to date, which factors are of greatest
importance. Main causes cited are: cyclical noise disturbances from thruster
firings, communications or movementwithin the spacecraft, staggered sleep
periods, significant displacements of the astronauts normal diurnal cycle, the
unfamiliar sleep environment and excitement.
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TABLE5-1 RELATIONSHIPOF NC-SERIESCURVESTO SOUNDAPPLICATIONS(37G)
OFFICES
i
NC (OR NCA)CURVE COF_NICATIONENVIRONMENT
NC-20TO.NC-30 VERY QUITEOFFICE;SUITABLEFOR LARGECONFERENCES.TELEPHONE USE SATISFACTORY
NC-30TO NC-35 "QUIET"OFFICE;SATISFACTORYFOR CONFERENCESAT A ]_5-FT ABLES:NORMALVOICE,10
TO 30 FT. TELEPHONEUSE SATISFACTORY
i
NC-35TO NC-40 SATISFACTORYFOR CONFERENCESAT A G- TO 8-FT TABLE:NORMALVOICE,G TO 12 FT.
TELEPHONEUSE SATISFACTORY
NC-4_0TO NC-50 SATISFACTORYFOR CONFERENCESAT A 4- TO 5-FT TABLE;NORMALVOICE,3 TO G FT;
RAISEDVOICE G TO 12 FTo TELEPHONEUSE OCCASIONALLYSLIGHTLYDIFFICULT
N_-.50TO NC-55 UNSATISFACTORYFOR CONFERENCESOF MORE THANTWO OR THREEPEOPLE;NORMALVOICE,
].TO 2 FT; RAISEDVOICE3 TO 6 FT. TELEPHONEUSE SLIGHTLYDIFFICULTim l
(aa
o_ ABOVENC-55 "VERYNOISY." OFFICEENVIRONVENTUNSATISFACTORY.TELEPHONEUSE DIFFICULT
i j
V_ORKSPACES,SHOPAREAS,ETC.
NC-I_OTO NC-70 PERSON-TO-PERSONCOMMUNICATIONWITH RAISEDVOICE SATISFACTORY,i TO 2 FT" SLIGHTLY
DIFFICULT,3 TO G FT. TELEPHONEUSE DIFFICULT
i
NC-70TO NC-80 PERSON-TO-PERSONCOMPEINICATIONSLIGHTLYDIFFICULTWITH RAISEDVOICE,I TO 2 FT;
SLIGHTLY/DIFFICULTWITH SHOUTING,3 TO G FT. TELEPHONEUSE VERY DIFFICULT
i i
ABOVE NC-80 PERSON-TO-PERSONCOFMJNICATIONEXTREMELYDIFFICULT. TELEPHONEUSE UNSATISFACTORY
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STRATEGIES
I. In order to maintain a reasonably quiet space station, necessary
design requirements and specification must be imposed during the initial phase
of the program, and maintained throughout the design, engineering, and
manufacturing process. Investigation of latest technology in sound
attenuation should be utilized for equipment design and materials.
2. It is suggested that measurementsand assessments be apportioned
for all noise sources that will include DB levels and frequencies, for
individual compartments and accumulated noise. Sleep stations would require
special analyses to determine an average sound level, as these areas should
not be completely silent. Work and laboratory areas will need levels that
will cause ease of communication and a system of iland-signals should be
developed as an emergency back-up procedure. All crew membersrequire a
screening for establishment of baseline noise levels and sensitivity.
AREASFORFURTHERSTUDY
The following listing extracts areas identified in the initial study
that should be given more attention Someof these items may be underway or
have beencompleted. Theseitemsin no way commenton completenessor status
of the relateditems. Rather,the list indicatesthatwithinthe data
reviewedthereseemedto be areasof datadeficiency.
I. Developstandarddecision-makingtechniquesto be used for
insulationvs. isolationof noise
2. Specifythe need for a maximumallowableNC-acousticrequirement
per module(workareavs. habitablearea)and requireacoustic
subsysteminputapportionmentwithineachmodule. Includea
qualificationtestto apportionedacousticalrequirements
3. Providefor standardhand signalsfor emergencycommunicationin
untenablenoiseenvironment.
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6. TERRITORIALISSUES
BACKGROUND
The spatialorganizationof smallgroupsin the cabinsof spacecraft
thatare limitedin size is characterizedby the presenceof commonworking
and livingquarters,unchangingand specificdecor,and tilevirtual
impossibilityof evading"theterritorialwaters"of another. All this has a
significanteffecton the nervoussystemand altersthe natureof socializatin
and interpersonalprocesses.
ISSUES
Crowdingand Privacyin the SpaceHabitat
With the exceptionof Skylab,Americanand Russianspacecraftshave had
very limitedlivingspace. In the earlierprograms,Geminiand Apollo,former
astronautshavecommentedon the extremecrowdingin the capsules. But the
adjustmentto theseconditionswas good,presumablydue to the natureof the
astronautsand the prestigeof the program. The differencebetweenthese
programs,includingShuttleand SpaceStation,must be establishedclearlyto
preventunsupportablegeneralizations.Thisgeneralizationcouldlead to
misleadinginformationwhichcouldfind itsway intothe designof Space
Station.
As the personalrewardsfrom spaceflightdiminish,participantsmay be
muchmore susceptibleto the stressesof negativeenvironmentalconditions
suchas territorialissues. Sommer,Halland othershavedefinedpersonal
spaceas an "invisiblebubble",immediatelysurroundingthe body. (ll9)
Intrusionsintothis spacecouldlead to anxietyand discomfort- the
perceptionof crowding.
Personalspacethusis perceivedas an extensionof the self. The size
of thispersonalspacein any one socialcontactis a functionof the type of
interactionand relationshipbetweenthe peoplewho are interacting.Stress
ariseswhen a personperceivesthatthe spacehas beenviolated.
PersonalProperty
On the Shuttleprogram,the astronautsare allowedto carryon theirown
personal"ditty-bag".That is, eachastronauthas certainitemsthatare
uniqueto his/herperson. As the stay in spaceincreasesthesepersonalitems
becomeattachedwith the instinctof home (Earth). To violatethesearticles
could causepsychologicalproblemsalongwith a disruptionof the team
concept. Tilepotentialconflictarisesin the need to inspectthe contentsof
thesebagsfor hazardoussubstances.
Task/WorkSpace
It has been notedon the Shuttle/Spacelabflightsthatwork spacewithin
a moduleis at a premium. The allocationof worktasks shouldbe incorporated
into the timelineto ensurethatpeoplewill not be workingon top of each
other. On one of the Russianflights,a personnelproblemoccurredwhen one
of the cosmonautsproceededto do the other'swork.
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Intrusion of Personal Space
On the prior space programs, intrusion ilas not been addressed. But as
the program moves into long duration stays, it must be considered. Both
American and Soviet crews have commentedon the lack of privacy. On the
Soviet mission of 175 days, the Progress resupply vehicle brought up a privacy
curtain on its last trip, even though the crew was to return to Earth in a
short time. (155) Skylab crews also commentedon the need for a place to be
alone.
Lack of privacy also implies the intrusion of one's personal space.
This intrusion can cause such symptomsas anxiety and stress. In spaces as
confined as the Salyut-6 station, the Spacelab module, or the Orbiter crew
cabin, there is little opportunity to prevent this intrusion.
STRATEGIES
I. Determine reasonable "invisible bubble" dimensions and screen out
non-compatible peoples
2. Define/provide personal storage space
3. Provide logistic support to personal preference
4. Allow "personalization" of personal space
5. Train for mutually understood definition of "territory"
AREASFORFURTHERSTUDY
The following listing extracts areas identified in the initial study
that should be given more attention. Someof these items may be underway or
have been completed. These items in no way commenton completeness or status
of the related items. Rather, the list indicates that within the data
reviewed there seemedto be areas of data deficiency.
I. Define/provide personal storage space.
2. Orient crew toward "non-violation" of personal territory.
3. Include personal consumables (toilet articles, etc.) in a master
logistics planning list.
4. Determine method of measuring reasonable personal "space bubble" -
flat vs. the sphere within which an individual feels threatened.
Then, screen for crew _ho can function within this volume.
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7. BEHAVORIALPROTOCOLS
BACKGROUND
Both the Russian and the United States space programs have experienced
incidents wherein the crew by its own choice, either did not respond to or
ignored ground control direction. On Skylab 3, many new experiments were
added to the flight plan that the crew had not trained for. As a result,
there were manyunanticipated difficulties, sucll as errors and lost data. The
ground pressed the crew in order to take advantage of precious time. Tile crew
finally turned off ground communication for one day and spent their time in
leisure activcity, mostly looking out the window. The commanderfinally asked
Mission Control to rework the schedule to give the crew more discretion in
scheduling experiments. Once this new system began, the crew's performance
improved considerably. (379) SomeSoviet crews have demonstrated hostility
with ground control staff by holding back on confidential messagesand
purposely hiding information and reactions. Apparently, on tile 185 day
mission, cosmonauts Ryumin and Popov turned off all radio communication with
the ground for 2 days. (177)
In inter-cultural flights, the Russian cosmonauts were concerned about
crew integrity during emergency situations. There is concern about
translating from one language to another during these times. Multi-national
crews are sent up to visit long duration crews to break the boredom. However,
they can also bring a certain degree of misunderstanding and confusion based
on language and value differences. Russian crews have complained that foreign
accents deform Russian expressions leading to misunderstandings. (177) There
are also the more subtle issues of customs and cuisine that may create
difficulties.
ISSUES
The "Who's in charge?" issue has a very strong safety flavor. Someone
has to be responsible for I) the space station and, 2) the crew actions. The
personal perogatives of the cre_nen should be spelled out clearly; what can
one do and what can one not do. The degree of discipline is an important
safety issue. Someworkarounds to a potential risk situation beyond design
capability rely on following very explicit instructions. Not to do so could
expose the crew and station to pre-assessed risk situations.
The "Wilo's in charge?" issue extends to include the degree of autonomy
from the ground that the station will enjoy. Rather than the naval/merchant
capitol ship concept wherein the captain implements a clearly defined mission,
the astronauts/cosmonauts appear to be in a situation where the advisors by
far outnumber the adviseeso This could be a stress generator for the crew
particularly if the current system of mission ground control is utilized.
In a multi-cultural space station crew, a long term stay in space could
cause problems if the cre_nembers are not compatible: an example is if a
crewmembermust express or insists on expressing social or cultural
characteristics or behaviors that conflict with other crm_embers. The
implicit safety issues are the unwillingness to cooperate, the failure to
communicate or plain misunderstanding.
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STRATEGIES
I. Screencrewmembersfor openvs. closedacceptancepatterns
2. Clearlydefine"Who'sin charge?"in the stationand "Who'sin
charge?"on the groundwith a concisedelineationof the division
of responsibilityand authority
3. Educatecre_cmembersin cross-culturaland intra-culturaltolerances
AREASFOR FURTHERSTUDY
The followinglistingextractsareasidentifiedin the initialstudy
that shouldbe givenmore attention. Someof theseitemsmay be undemlayor
havebeencompleted. Theseitemsin no way commenton completenessor status
of tilerelateditems. Rather,the listindicatesthatwithinthe data
reviewedthereseemedto be areasof datadeficiency.
I. Screencrewmembersfor prejudicesand openessto differingcultural
norms.
2. Provide education/orientation for crewmembersregarding cross-
cultural issues and problems.
3. Train cre_nembers to utilized group dynamics to work out potential
behavorial protocol conflicts.
4. As a lastresort,developchemical/physicalrestraintsystemfor
out-of-controlcrev_embers.
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8. SCHEDULING
BACKGROUND
In continuous24 hrs/day,year roundoperations,personnelmust be
scheduledto provideon-goingservices.Most shiftwork schedulescurrently
inuse by bothmilitaryand civilianfacilitiesdo not take intoaccounteven
the most basicscienfiticknowledgeaboutsleep-wakecyclephysiologyand the
limitsof humancircadianentrainment.Furtherwork needsto be doneon both
the basictheoryof schedulingand its practicalapplication.
Some fundamentalinformationis alreadyavailableon the rangeof
entrainmentof humansleep-wakecyclesand thiscan be usedto designed
duty-restscheduleswhichleastdisruptthe sleep-wakecycleand minimize
deteriorationin alertnessand performance.The SovietUnionis paying
considerableattentionto circadianfactorsand scheduling.
The SpaceStationwill be functioning24 hoursa day,with efficiency
and smoothperformancerequiredinmany key aspectsof the system. Thereare
significantcosts incurredby inappropriatelydesignedduty-resttime
scheduleswhichreducethe performanceand productivityand increasethe
probabilityof errorsthroughfatigueon the partof personnel. Tilejoint
flightof Russians/Frenchwere ableto sleepas plannedearlyin tileflight
but as the burdenof workmountedthroughoutthe _leekthey had to skip some
sleeptimeto keep up with the workload. (198)
The Russiansmonitorthe heartrateof the cosmonautsto maintaina
constantrate. When the heartratedecreasesor increasesthe scheduleis
adjustedto maintainthe constantrate. (180)
Performanceand physiologicalfunctionsshowdeteriorationafterrapid
travelby air acrosstimezones - the syndromeknownas jet-lag. The exact
mechanismsunderlyingjet-lagare not fullyunderstood.Effortsshouldbe
directedto definingthe pathophysiologicalmechanismsinvolvedand devloping
methodsto betterfacilitateadaptation.
It has been shownti_atdisturbanceof circadianrhythmicinternalphase
relationshipin animals,particularlyover longperiods,can resultin
pathologicalmanifestations.In humans,circadiandesynchronizationi shift
workersis oftenmanifestedby variouspsychosomaticomplaints,including
fatigue,sleepdisturbancesand gastrointestinalproblems. Transmeridian
flight,which inducesphase shiftsbetweenthe circadianrhythmsof the body
and the timingof externalenvironmentalsynchionizershas beenknownto
resultin non-specificfatigue,insomniaand sleepdisturbances,
gastrointestinalcomplaints,headaches,disorientationand irritability.
The Apolloastronautsgenerallyscheduled12 hoursof work,8 hoursof
sleep,and 4 hoursof relaxationeachday. However,theirdayswere busy,
interestingand new. For more routine,long-termspace-missionconditions,
shorterwork/restcyclesmay be preferred.Naturally,thesework/rest
scheduleswouldhaveto be modifiedsomewhatto fit intothe sleep/awake
rhythmfor the crew. (096)
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Despitethe circadianadvantagesof similarsleep-awakecyclesfor the
crew,a staggeredschedulehas been proposed.The baselineindicates,at the
present,an 8 crewmembersocietywith 4 on and 4 off. Thus,a crewwouldbe
awakeat all timesto handlethe station.
The thirdSkylabcrew demonstratedthe problemsassociatedwith
overscheduling.With boredoma constantthreatof potentialstress,it is
often seenas wise to make daysextremelybusy,leavinglittletime for
reflectionor inactivity.(089)
The stresseswith schedulingexperiencedto datein the spaceprograms
havebeenmainlyrelatedto prearrangedschedules.The Russiansallowsome
optionsin the day to day organizationof work and leisuretime. Thiswas
initiateddue to the identificationof the psychologicalneed to havesome
optionsof control;somefreedomof choicein how theyspentthe day. (155)
The resultsof overschedulingare now beginningto showduringthe Shuttle
flights.
ISSUES
Disturbancesof CircadianRhythm
The circadiantimingsystemis one of the most poorlyunderstood
physiologicalsystems. This is becausethe neuralpacemakerswhich time
circadianrhythmshaveonlybegunto be identifiedin the last decadeand the
neuraland endocrinemechanismsof communicationsof circadiantiming
informationand the consequencesof disruptionare just now being
investigated.
On the firstShuttle/Spacelabflight,the firsttimea split-shiftwas
utilized,the crew reportedhavingtroubletellingwhat time/dayit was. This
issuemay affectthe roleof sleep,responseto extremeenvironments,and mood
and effectivestate.
Fatigue
Consideringthe importanceof optimalcrev_emberperformanceduring
missions,it is desirableto monitorfatiguestatusthrucrew reports. In
thisway, realisticexpectationscan be derivedwith respectto physical
performancecapability.Withthe onsetof fatigue,appropriateaction
remedialcan be takento bestachievethe desiredoutcomeof the mission.
Tile fficiencyand well-beingof the crew, on any lengthof a space
mission,is affectedadverselywhen the crev_embers'sleeppatternsare
consistentlydisturbedby the environmentwithinthe spacecraft.Spaceflight
experienceto datehas indicatedthatmanycrewmembersexperiencedifficulties
in fallingasleep,and have neededto takemedication.
No clearevidenceexiststhatall astronautsare affectedor thatcrew
memberswho are affectedsufferthe samedisturbances.Somecomplainthat
sleepwas inadequateor that therewas a considerableshiftin sleepperiods
fromexpectedhome sleeptime. On the Skylabflights,it was foundthat a
pre-sleepperiodof at leastl hourof mentallynondemandingactivitywas
required. Thisallowedthe crewto relaxto the pointwheretheycould fall
asleep. (134)
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Several astronauts were affected more for the first two or three days.
Others (on Apollo flights), had difficulty sleeping on the lunar surface.
Skylab astronauts, on the other hand, experienced little difficulty as a
group, and it has been stated that any difficulties they had did not affect
performance. Skylab cre_embers slept satisfactorily in sleep restraint
systems in erect, against-the-wall orientation, and the only relocation of
sleep facilities was attributed to environmental, not psychological factors.
(134) Both temperature and airflow triggered sleep restraint reorientation or
relocation. Sleep compartment ventilation should flow in a head-to-foot
pattern and flexibility in "blanket" arrangements should also be provided to
accommodatevarying thermal conditions.
During the first 5 years of an Antarctic study, the major effort of a
research program was an analysis of the electroencephalogram (EEG) sleep data
collected at six points in time during tile subjects' participation in the
study. S. Hurly and Pierce selected sleep as the primary dependent variable
because it provided an objective, quantifiable measure of all the forces
acting upon the individual: psychological, social, and environmental. (086)
Work/Rest Cycles
The long term consequences of rotating rest and duty time schedules are
poorly understood but there is now sufficient information to give credence to
concerns about effects on morbidity and mortality. Research done to date on
such personnel as air traffic controllers and others on rotating schedules can
aid in establishing criteria for crew performance without deterioration. (204)
Crew Changeover
This issue has not been addressed to date. The changeover period is one
that will have to be studied in great detail. The impacts include:
consumables, impact to timeline, escape/rescue considerations, logistics,
etc. (See Figures 8-I and 8-2).
Interruption of Diurnal Periodicity
During prolonged submergedmissions of 60 days or more, typical nuclear
submarine duty, the submariner is removed from day-night cues. The literature
reviewed supports the findings that such biological processes as heart rate,
blood pressure, body temperature and quite possibly quality of performance are
synchronized to such circadian cues as sunrise and sunset. (95)
Studies are indicating that the desynchronization of these cycles by the
imposition of 4 hours on 8 hours off work/rest cycles may contribute to
fatigue-like symptomsobserved during long periods of submergence.
The crew debriefing of STS-6 revealed that due to the timeline
scheduling on the Shuttle flights, the crew were beginning to experience
difficulty in being able to distinguish what day it was and what time it was.
Because of this, a mission time clock has now been added, along with a map
that allows them the knowledge of their location in relation to Earth.
47
• AGGREGATE AMCONCEPT
•ORBITALOPERATIONS •RECYCLE
//N ,POST-ORBIT
// REHABILITATION
A_//-_ °LEAVE
__e TRAINIrlGrD
_ ,GROUNDOPERATIONS OTHERICT_41TIESi
• O_'IEFOURTHOFTIKESPENTINEACHrIISSIONSEG_,ENT
Figure8-I Scopeof the TeamingConcept
SPACEHABITATSCHEDULING- PERSONNEL
FOURCREWSWOULDHANDLEALLASPECTSOFSPACEHABITAT
91DAYS i 91DAYS i glDAYS ! glDAYSONSTATION A / B / C ,
REHABILITATION
TIMEOFF _ F_I _
MISSION
CONTROL B / C / D / A _" ,/ B
GROUND _ _ORIENTATION
UNSCHEDULED
GROUND
TRAINING _ _ L _ ,/" _ _ 7
Figure 8-2 Scheduling Consideration
48
STRATEGIES
I. Set up integratedair-groundtrainingto preventthe them/us
syndromeand alsoto help facilitatethe crew-changeoverperiod
2. Schedulingmust take intoaccount:
a. Maximumallowabletime in orbitrecommendedper year
(radiation,physicaldebilitation,psychologicalaberration)
3. For crewchangeover;
a. Beginchangeoveron the ground
b. Maintainorbiterat stationduringchangeover
c. Preparedetailplanfor stationcontingencyoperationsduring
the changeover
4. Continuousmonitoringof "healthmaintenance"to ensureconstant
statusof astronaut(fatigue,heartrate,etc.)
5. Allow flexibilityin scheduleso thatastronautshave the optionof
choice
6. Provideseparateenclosedsleepstationsto preventinterferenceof
sleeptimeallotmentdue to noise,lighting,vibration,etc.
7. Allow restperiodsduringwork scheduleto preventfatigue,etc.
(i.e.,l-g criteria)
8. Schedulingmust take intoaccountthoseareasof work,maintenance,
recreationand exercise
AREASFOR FURTHERSTUDY
The followinglistingextractsareasidentifiedin the initialstudy
that shouldbe givenmoreattention. Someof these itemsmay be underwayor
havebeencompleted. Theseitemsin no way commenton completenessor status
of the relateditems. Rather,the listindicatesthatwithinthe data
reviewedthereseemedto be areasof datadeficiency.
I. Dedicatedmoduletasksfor crew vs. commontask,all-module
assignment.
2. Generalistvs. specialistfor crew trainingguidelines.
3. Lessthan 90 day recyclesvs. on-stationexpendablecosts and crew
personalequipmentneededto supportextendedstay.
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9. CLEANING/DISINFECTING
BACKGROUND
Cleaningand disinfectingduringflight,in the priorspaceprograms,
was not an issuedue to the shortdurationand non-reusablecapsules. The
Skylabprogramdevelopeda microbialcontaminationcontrolintercenterworking
groupwhosemembershiprepresentedboth scientific(medicine,micro-biology,
chemistry)and engineering(systemsand materials)disciplinesas well as the
programofficesand astronautoffice. Theirprimarypurposewas to identify
all sourcesof microbialcontaminants,determinespecificmicrobial
contaminants(bothbacterialand fungal)thatwouldoccurin the habitat,
determineacceptablelevelsand establishcontrolmethodsand techniques.
Mirobialcontrolwas accomplishedthroughthe use of biocidewipes and
wet wipes. The biocidewipeswereused for generalsurfacedisinfectingin
the wardroom,wastemangementutilityand the trashairlock,as well as major
organic(urine)spills. The wet wipeswereused for foodutensilsand food
traycleanup. (377)
Withthe on-setof tileShuttleprogram,the strategyfor this issuehad
to change. The scenariochangedto longerdurationand for the firsttime,a
reusablevehicle. Also,the conceptof the variablefacilitycame into
being. Experiments,equipmentand peopleare beingchangedout eachflight.
With thesechangesin mind, the issuesof hygiene,cleaning,disinfecting,
preventionof pathogenicbuild-up,trashmanagement,etc.,had to be
addressed. The programis stilllearningin many of theseareas.
The SpaceStationscenariowill changetheseissuesoveragain. The
main forcingfunctionswill be: a non-returnablevehicle;equipment,
experiments,peopleinterchangingevery 90 days,the introductionof material
processing,animals,etc. All of thesewill haveto be assessedfor impact
upon the stationand people.
ISSUES
CrewTasks
In the past,for areasrequiringlittleor no technicalbackground,
peoplecouldbe hiredto do the mundanework. On the SpaceStationthis
luxurywill not exist. Specialistswill haveto be cross-trainedto do
generaltasks,eventhe lowlytasksof cleaningthe area.
Scheduleof Activities
Accuratedata regardingamountof time spentin maintenanceon the
Salyutstationsand on Skylabare not available.The Skylabfiguresare
biasedby the work aroundscausedby shroudfailureon launchand subsequent
inabilityto deployone of the panels. Salyutdataare subjectiveand not
discrete. The objectiveof the spacestationprogramappearsto be that no
more than20% of the station- stationchargeablehoursbe devotedto
maintenance,upkeepor repair. The allocationfor theseactivitiesshouldbe
includedin the spacestationplannedtimeline.
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Methodsand TIaterialsUsed
Cleaningand disinfectingcouldbe accomplishedwithan emphasison
aqueousmaterials. Organicsolventusageshouldbe heldto a minimum. A
practicalcleanenvironmentcan be achievedthroughtilejudioususe of steam
and dilutesolutionsof l_drogenPeroxide(H202). Neitherapproachwould
achievesterilization,but would drasticallyreducephysicaland
microbiologicalcontamination.
Steamcleaningwill removesurfacecontaminationby meansof solvation
and/orincreasingthe vaporpressureof semi-volatilecontaminants.A
complimentaryvacuumsystemwould rapidlyremovethe contaminatedmoisture.
Thiscouldthenbe treatedto removecontaminantsand yield purewater.
HydrogenPeroxidewould be storedas concentratedaqueoussolutions
(80-90%by weidht)in a suitablealuminumcontainer. The concentrated
H202would be dilutedwithwater to formsolutionscontaining3 to 6%
H202. The means of dispensingthe concentratedH202in zero-gwould
be similarto the X-15APU system. The aluminumreservoirwouldcontaina
collapsiblebladder,a perforatedstand-pipe,and meansof pressurizingthe
exteriorof the bladder.
The bladdermaterialwouldbe made fromclassl or 2 elastomers.
(Note: Vicone31-2was usedon the X-15. Morecompatibleviconeswere
developedaftercompletionof the X-15program.)
The diultedH202 solutionswould be usedfor washingor scrubbing
contaminatedsurfaces.HydrogenPeroxidehas the advantageof beingeffective
againstanaerobicmicroorganixmsand producesnonpollutingdecomposition
products(re: H20 and 02). Liquidgaseouseffluentdetoxification
systemsbasedupon H_O2 _avebeendeveloped.Thus H202couldbe used
for cleaningand dislnfection,and in thesedetoxificationsystems.
Additionaldisinfectingcan be achievedby: l) use of ultraviolet(UV)
radiation,2) exposureto hardvacuumby ventingto outerspace. The use of
the above-mentionedmethodsshouldachievea satisfactorilycleanworking
environmentwith a minimumof residualpollution. (374,375)
ConsumableLogistics
The consumablesmust be loggedon a datamanagmentsystemso that
amounts,location,where used,when used,can be assessed. In caseof loss of
module,etc.,dualstoragecapabilitymustexist.
PathogenicDevelopment
Modules,equipment,etc.,must be testedon a periodicscheduleto
ensurethatpathogenicbuild-upis not occurring.Trashmanagementwill be
most importantin the preventionof this build-up.
Breakdownof Crew ImmunologySystem
Due to the isolatedenvironmentand zero-gimpactuponthe body,an
on-goinghealthmaintenanceprogrammust be maintained.For example: rigid
exerciseprogram,constantdiet,etc.
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STRATEGIES
I. Identifyareasfor primaryand secondarycleaning
2. Developmethodsto cleanspecialareas
3. Rotatecrewmemberthrough"grunt"work tasks
4. Establishmaintenanceitemsand regularlyscheduledactivities
5. Consumables/logisticsonsideration
6. Determinecleanliness/disinfectantlevels
7. Identifymaterialsto be usedand screenfor compatiblity
8. Biological/bacteriologicalon-orbittestingshouldbe incorporated
to preventbuild-up
9. Storageareafor trash shouldstrategicallybe locatedto prevent
propagationof pathogens
lO. Nextscheduledcrew shouldbe isolatedfor TBD periodof time prior
to inhabitingthe SpaceStationto precludeinfectionof on-board
crew
AREAS FOR FURTHERSTUDY
The followinglistingextractsareasidentifiedin the initialstudy
that shouldbe givenmoreattention. Someof theseitemsmay be underwayor
havebeencompleted. Theseitemsin no way commenton completenessor status
of the relateditems. Rather,the list indicatesthatwithinthe data
reviewedthereseemedto be areasof datadeficiency.
I. Consideradequatecapabilityfor storageinventorying,handlingand
dispositionof servicing,maintenance,plaingarbage,and
consumablesforcleaningand repair.
2. Identifyfamilyof cleaning/disinfectingchemicalscompatiblewith
selectedECLSSapproach.
3. Traincrewmembersin all phasesof stationtasks,housekeeping.
4. Defineminimumcrewcleanlinessrequirements(thismay be an
intra-culturalissue).
5. Definerequirements(totalvolumeand flow rates)for potableand
non-potablewater.
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I0. HYGIENE
BACKGROUND
Hygieneconsistsof washingup, showering,shaving,combingone'shair,
washingclothes,etc. Beforethe Skylabprogram,the hygienedid not include
showersbecauseof the lack of space. The Orbiterin its earlyflightsdid
not even includea hygienestation. This now has beenaddedand testedby thecrew.
For crewmoraleand healthpurposes,the needfor a simpleshowerand
hand-washsinkbecomesdesirablefor longdurationmissions. On Skylab,
crewmembersreportedtakinga showerwas a "painin the neck",but well worth
the inconvenience.(136) The creva_embersdid feel "clean"aftera shower.
Thereare otherareasof sociallyacceptablehygienepracticesthat
shouldbe initiatedto providefor personalchoicesand crew compatible
personalities.Keepingeachallocatedpersonalspacein orderand clean
shouldbe addressedas housekeepingpractices,coupledwith frequencyof
clothingcleaningchanges. Eachindividualshouldhavea choiceof
environmentallyaccePtablesoaps,deodorant,toothpaste,etc.
A moreefficientmethodof bodywaste disposaland collectionshouldbe
investigated.The WasteManagementSystemshouldbe reliable,safe,
comfortable,easy to use, uni-sexualand hygienicallycontrolled.Also
involvedwith thissystemare the factorsof privacy,restraintsand
anthropometrics.
In additionto fullbody shower,handwashersshouldbe in convenient
locationswith housekeepingaddedfor designconsiderations.FigurelO-I is
an approachfor a micro-gshower. This showerconceptfulfillsthe need for
an efficient,fastmethodof personalhygiene. Water is appliedunder
pressure,recirculatedthrougha filtrationsystemand reusedthrougha
non-potablereservoir. The combinationof waterand partialvacuumwill be
utilizedto removeairbornewater and soapglobules. Thistypeof evacuati
will partiallydry the crewmemberand then a minimumamountof towel dryin_
willbe required.
ISSUES
SpaceClothingStandards
Establishsafe,comfortable,utilitarianclothingguidelinesfor space
applications.Theseguidelineswill serveas a base for any necessaryNASA
standards. Previousspacestudieshaveshownthat reusableclothingis more
cost effectivethandisposableitems. Durability,linting,and electrostatic
standardsneedto be establishedfor long durationmissions. Areas to be
addressedencompasshow to clean and store,personalconsiderations(i.e.,
color,coverage,feel,allergenics),and compatibilitywithprojected
atmosphericcompositionsneedto be assessed. (FigureI0-2). Investigate
pastexperiencesand establishfundamentalprimarycriteriafor the following
main categories:Comfort,Design,Utility,Health& Safety.
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Figure I0-I Micro-g Shower Approach (Rockwell International)
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• NON_LE
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Figure 10-2 Space Station CrewmemberApparel Considerations
(Rockwell International)
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Comfort- The materialselectionshallincludethe physicalpropertiesof:
color,wearability,feeland permeability.It shouldalsobe testedfor the
chemicalpropertiesof out-gassing,allergenics,chemicalcompatibilityand
staticelectricity.
Design- Clothingshouldhavethe ease of donningand doffingwith adequate
pocketaccessibilityand securement.The uniformityof designshouldbe
considered,with possibleconsiderationas to distinctionbetweenmale,
female,rankand taskrelatedduties. The garmentfit shouldbe looseand/or
stretchfor optimummovementsand flexibility.
Utility- Clothingshouldbe compatiblewith taskperformancewith adequate
paddingprotectionfor bumpsand agrastress.Materialwill be bestutilized
when tear and abrasionresistantqualitiesare included,coupledwith the use
of glovesfor fingerdexterity,tactilequalityand non-slipsurface.
Health/Hygiene- SpaceStationgarmentsshallbe reuseableand methods
providedfor wash and wear (or alternateform of cleaning). Clothingmust be
hypoallergenicand havethermalprotectionfor heatand hold. Garmentsshould
includethe necessaryhealthmonitoringequipmentpotentialsfor dosimeters
and otherbio-medinstrumentationconnections.Fasteners/connectionsfor
cleanroom accountrementsmay be considered.
Safety- The basicoverallgarmentshouldincludea reasonablenumberof
-rI_Zr-fngs(or equivalent)for bodyrestraintand stability. Consideration
shouldbe givento the bungee/tethersand/orstandardreelsfor restraintat
variouswork stations. Theseconnectionsrequireelectricalconductibilityto
enableelectrostaticgroundsfor eachcrewman.
SkylabExperience(132)
The clothingworn duringthesemissionsbecamesoiledfromthe
cre_lember'sbodyand not the spacecraftenvironment.Shoeswere notedto
wear-outrapidly,as the toeswould not hold up to tilescuffingfrommotionof
pushingaboutand wear fromthe grid-typefloor.
STRATEGIES
I. Hygieneequipmentschedulingmustbe incorporatedintotime-line
(i.e.,showeruse)
2. Consumables/logisticsmust be takenintoconsideration
3. Wastehandling-methodsestablished
4. Personalequipmentscreeningfor flammability,off-gassing,crew
compatibility
5. Minimumdefinedcrewcleanlinessrequirements
6. Potential/pastcrewparticipationin designand selectionof
clothingand hygieneequipment
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AREASFOR FURTHERSTUDY
The followinglistingextractsareasidentifiedin the initialstudy
that shouldbe givenmore attention. Someof theseitemsmay be unde_layor
have beencompleted.These itemsin no way commenton completenessor status
of tilerelateditems. Rather,the list indicatesthatwithinthe data
reviewedthere seemedto be areasof datadeficiency.
I. Consultingwith astronauts,developa standardfor clothingoptions
and hygieneconsumablesoptions.
2. Considerschedulinghygiene(common)equipment.
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II. RECREATION
BACKGROUND
Withthe increasingof flightduration,the satisfactionof leisure
needswill becomemore critical.Most U.S.missionsto datehave been
relativelyshortand all havehad extremelyhighwork loads. Tileastronauts
of Skylab,particularlythe thirdcrew, had sucha heavywork loadthat
virtuallyno sparetimewas leftover. Availableto the crewwere books,tape
decksand games,but few were used (132). It is noteworthythatnot evenone
Skylabastronautfinishedmore thanone book duringthe entire84-daymission.(132)
Watchingthe preferencesof the crewmemberscouldbecomean issue. On
Apollo9, AstronautRustySchweickartook two piecesof classicalmusic.
Apparentlyone of the otherastronautsdid not care for that typeof musicand
it mysteriouslydisappeareduntilthe 9th day of tileflight. (173)
Problemswith recreationhas occurredon oceanographicresearchvessel.
Duringa 2-yearvoyageof the BritishAntarcticvesselRV Brensfield,the crew
tossedover-boarda largepartof the specimenscollectedbecauseof a dispute
about the use of the freezer. The freezer,on the beginningof the trip,was
used to storecold beer for usewithinthe recreationalperiods. As the
specimensbecamemore numerous,more storingspacewas needed. Alas,the beer
freezerwas takenover. Differencesalsoshowedup in tensionoverthe
differenttypesof music and the availableleisureactivities. (088) In
1978,one of the cosmonautsbeganto miss hismusic and guitar. To preventa
psychologicalissue,his guitarwas deliveredon the nextprogresssupply
ship. (155)
Futurecrews,withmore divisionof tasks,especiallythe mundanetype
tasks,are likelyto liveaccordingto schedulessimilarto thoseon ocean
rigs, ships,etc. Thiswould assumean 8 to lO hourworkingday. The 8 to lO
hour day wouldbe work only (doesnot includemeals,personalhygieneor
leisure).
The scopeof leisureactivitiespossibleon boardthe spacestationmay
be limitedand probablywill excludesportsand any outdooractivities.Some
type of substituteswill haveto be foundwhichwillbe considered
satisfactory.Duringthe Skylabmissions,the largeareasavailableallowed
the Skylabcrew to bounceoff the walls,performsomersaults,etc. (llg)
Thiswas reportedas a major sourceof enjoymentduringthemission. Also,
the wardroomwindowprovidedone of the more importantmeansof relaxation.
Most of the time,the Earthwas in viewand crewmenneverseemedto tire of
it. (132). Althoughexerciseis a mandatorypartof lifefor spaceduration,
it alsoprovidesa sourceof relaxation.On Skylab,a bicycle(ergometer)was
available. (132)
Hobbiesand leisureactivitiesof Antarcticparticipantshavebeenan
increasinginterestasan areaof psychologicalresearch. Duringthe winter
months,when work activitiesare reducedformost stationmembers,free time
is availablefor avocationaland recreationalactivities.The use madeof
thistimeand the satisfactionor boredomexperiencedby the individualmay
significantlyaffecthis psychologicaladjustment.
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An investigationwas made of hobbyinterestlikesand dislikesand
leisureactivitiespreferredby wintering-overpersonnelat smallstations.
Analyseswereconductedseparatelyfor Navyconstruction,Navy technical-
administrativeand civilianpersonnel. Drasticdifferenceswere notedin the
study.
Crewsmixed on the basisof sex,nationality,and vocationwill have
differentleisureinterests.As spacewill be at a premium,accommodation
must be made to includeleisureactivitiesin the time line,and provisions
shouldbe made in the facilities.
ISSUES
PersonalPreference- Eachpersonhas theirown uniquedefinitionof
what recreationmeansto them. Theirpersonalpreferencemay not be
compatiblewith themicro-genvironmentor the restrictionsof the space
station.
Types - An evaluationof the differenttypesof recreationalactivities,
equipment,etc.must be made priorto introductionintothe spacestation.
Also screeningfor compatibilityamongthe crewmust take placeto preventintra-crewstressors.
Location- The questionof where recreationwill takeplacehas not
reallybeenaddressed.The astronautmay want to retreatto his sleeparea or
maybe sit in the eatingareawith a headseton. The Russiancosmonautsengage
in chessgameswithvariouspeopleon the ground. The whereand when will
have to be scheduledintothe timeline.
Alonevs. GroupRecreation- Recreationaldevicesfall intotwo
categories.The firstare thosethatrequireone personinteraction.For
example: listeningto a personaltapefrom the familyor groundcommunication
with a lovedone or readinga book. The secondtype involvescrew
interaction:playingof cards,othergamesor just sittingand talking.
Again,intra-crewincompatibilitiesmay resultif someconcurrenceis not
reached.
Strategies
I. Requireminimumcrew "ActiveLeisureTime"
a. Must be incorporatedintoTimelineSchedule
b. Shouldbe adjustableper the needsof the astronaut
2. Screenfor crew segmentcompatibleleisureactivities
a. Screenfor crew likes/dislikes
b. Screenfor compatibilitywithSpaceStationcriteria/
guidelines
3. Defineallowablerecreationalequipmentand facilities
a. Incorporateintodefinitionlogicsticalneeds
62
AREASFOR FURTHERSTUDY
The followinglistingextractsareas identifiedin the initialstudy
that shouldbe givenmoreattention. Someof these itemsmay be underwayor
havebeencompleted. Theseitemsin no way commenton completenessor status
of the relateditems. Rather,the list indicatesthatwithinthe data
reviewedthere seemedto be areasof datadeficiency.
I. Definea privateelectroniccenterfor eachcabin to includeat
leastan entertainmentcenter(visual/aural),a privatetelevision
linkto Earth,backgroundmood generator(whitenoise).
2. When teaming,screencre_embers for compatiblerecreation
interests.
3. Preparespecificationfor recreationequipment/kitpertainingto
safety- with optionsfor person.
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12. VIOLATIONOF SAFETY
BACKGROUND
In 1979,the cosmonautRomanenkowas so excitedthathe couldnot wait
to poke his headout of the stationfor EVA. In his eagernesshe did not
followthe checklist. He forgotto securetilesafetytether. Had not the
othercosmonautgrabbedRomaneko'sfoot,he would havebecomea bit of free
orbitdebris. (173)
In the evolutionof tasksplannedon the spacestation(fabrication,
maintenance,repair,EVA/IVA,rigging,etc.),each activitywill havebeen
assessedfor risks. Unlikeindustrialtaskson the ground,safetycontrols
and inhibitingdeviceswill havebeen includedin the product/function
development.Becauseof tilis,therewill tendto be fewer "safetyand/or
emergencyprocedures"needed. But where needed,thesesafetyand/oremergency
procedureswill requireenforcement.In the spectacularnatureof the initial
Skylaband Shuttleflights,crewconstraintswereeitherimplied,assumedor
presentedfew occasionsfor explicitenforcement.Withthe adventof an
opertionalspacefacilitywith moretotal in-spacehoursbeingrealized,
disciplinegoverningsafetyprocedureswill haveto be observed.
ISSUES
Non-standardproceduresare,and will be devisedas workaroundsin
unexpectedsituations.The programshouldbe flexibleenoughto accommodate
theseworkarounds.Other issuesare derivedfromundefinedcontingency
actions. For instance,the inabilityof the SolarMax trunnionpin docking
deviceto latchcauseda contingencyoperationalmode to be implemented.Some
actionstakencould haveendangeredthe EVA crewmanor damagedthe SolarMax
satellite. In othercaseson someShuttleflights,somepersonalequipment
has not beenscreenedfor flammabilityor toxicity,suchas cotton"T" shirts,
magicmarkers,and the like.
STRATEGIES
I. Clearlyidentifysafetycriticalsegmentsof proceduresrequiring
mandatorycompliance
2. Preparelogicor taskflowchartsthatidentifiedas many
contingencyoperations
3. Screenal__Icarry-onpersonalequipment
4. Trainingfor all crew to understandimportanceand consequencesof
safetyprocedures.
AREAS FOR FURTHERSTUDY
The followinglistingextractsareasidentifiedin the initialstudy
that shouldbe givenmore attention.Some of theseitemsmay be undemvayor
havebeencompleted. These itemsin no way commenton completenessor status
of the relateditems. Rather,the list indicatesthatwithinthe data
reviewedthereseemedto be areasof data deficiency.
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I. Developrealisticallowableradiationdoseratetablesfor part of
bodyfor EVA,fligilt,quarter,year and whole life.
2. Developcolorcodingsystemfor all tubing,piping,emergency
p,assageway,damagecontrolequipmentand tasksincluding
warnings_',"cautions",and "notes".
3. Clearlyidentifysafetycriticalsegmentsof tasksto insure
mandatorycompliance(hardware,proceduralsoftware).
4. Preparetaskflowchartsthat identifyas many contingency
operationsas possibleto determineresponseneed.
5. Screenall carry-onpersonalequipment.
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